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Abstract 
There exists uncertainty for clinicians over how the separate sub-component processes of 
psychological flexibility, a core construct of the Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
model, interact and influence distress experienced. The present study (N = 567) employed 
latent class analysis to (i) identify potential classes (i.e., subgroups) of psychological 
flexibility based on responses on measures of key sub-component process, and (ii) to examine 
whether such classes could reliably differentiate levels of self-reported psychological distress 
and positive and negative emotionality. We found three distinct classes: (i) High 
Psychological Flexibility, (ii) Moderate Psychological Flexibility, and (iii) Low 
Psychological Flexibility. Those in the Low Psychology Flexibility class reported highest 
levels of psychological distress, whereas those in the High Psychological Flexibility class 
subgroup reported lowest levels of psychological distress. This study provides a clearer view 
to clinicians of the profile of the broader spectrum of the psychological flexibility model to 
facilitate change in clients. 
 
Keywords: Psychological Flexibility, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, Experiential 
Avoidance, Latent Class Analysis 
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Psychological flexibility is at the core of the Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; 
Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; 2012) model of behavior change and is defined as the 
“ability to contact the present moment more fully as a conscious human being, and to change 
or persist in behavior when doing so serves valued ends” (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & 
Lillis, 2006, p. 6). The polar opposite to psychological flexibility is termed psychological 
inflexibility, characterized by a behavioral pattern of excessive control of a person’s thoughts, 
feelings, and emotions, with a tendency to avoid unpleasant internal experiences at the 
expense of more effective or valued actions (Levin et al., 2014; but see Kashdan & 
Rottenberg, 2010, for a caveat on framing flexibility and inflexibility as opposing ends of a 
psychological continuum). As put by Renshaw (2018), psychological wellbeing is supported 
and maintained by psychologically flexible behavior, whereas the development of mental 
health difficulties is facilitated by psychologically inflexible behavior.  
 Enhancing a client’s psychological flexibility has been a key goal of ACT-based 
intervention studies (e.g., Berghoff, McDermott, & Dixon-Gordon, 2018; Fledderus, 
Bohlmeijer, Fox, Schreurs, & Spinhoven, 2013; Gloster, Meyer, & Lieb, 2017; Simon & 
Verboon, 2016; Twohig, Plumb-Vilardaga, Levin, & Hayes, 2015). Moreover, Gloster, 
Klotsche, Chaker, Hummel, and Huyer (2011) reported that psychological flexibility “adds to 
the explanation of clinically relevant variables, such as functioning and impairment, beyond 
well-validated measures of depression, anxiety, and stress as well as anxiety sensitivity and 
neuroticism” (p. 976). Indeed, Gloster et al. (2017) found that psychological flexibility 
moderated a wide variety of stressors in a large Swiss sample, and proposed that increasing 
psychological flexibility could be a desirable and achievable public health target. 
 Psychological flexibility is a broad, overarching construct comprised of six distinct 
sub-processes: acceptance, cognitive defusion, self-as-context, present moment awareness, 
values clarification, and committed action (Hayes et al., 2006). At the other end of the 
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spectrum, psychological inflexibility comprises experiential avoidance, cognitive fusion, self-
as-content, lack of present moment awareness, lack of values, and lack of commitment to 
action (Levin et al., 2014). Whereas much research, as noted above, has focused on targeting 
the overarching construct of psychological flexibility/inflexibility, a growing body of 
evidence illustrates the utility of individual component sub-processes of psychological 
inflexibility as potentially useful explanatory concepts in terms of how people cope with 
psychological distress and suffering in a wide variety of domains (e.g., Bardeen & Fergus, 
2016; Chawla & Ostafin, 2007; Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 2012; Monestès et al., 
2017; Trindade, Ferreira, & Pinto-Gouveia, 2017). 
Experiential avoidance is the most widely researched component of psychological 
inflexibility (e.g., Bardeen, Fergus, & Orcutt, 2013; Gerhart, Baker, Hoerger, & Ronan, 2014; 
Karekla & Panayioutou, 2011; Monestès et al., 2017). It is defined as behavior that attempts 
to “alter the frequency or form of unwanted private events, including thoughts, memories, 
and bodily sensations, even when doing so causes personal harm” (Hayes, Pistorello, & 
Levin, 2012, p. 981). Experiential avoidance has been linked to a wide range of clinically 
relevant phenomena (Chawla & Ostafin, 2007; Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 
1996). For example, experiential avoidance has been found to be a key process in emotional 
disorders (Spinhoven, Drost, de Rooij, van Hemert, & Pennix, 2014), depressive symptoms 
(Kashdan, Breen, Afram, & Terhar, 2010; Schut & Boelen, 2017), binge eating (Lillis, 
Hayes, & Levin, 2011), body image disturbance (Blakey, Reuman, Bucholz, & Abramowitz, 
2017), social anxiety (Kashdan et al., 2010; Kashdan et al., 2013), chronic pain (Karademas 
et al., 2017), anxiety sensitivity and stress and anxiety (Bardeen et al., 2013; Bardeen, Fergus, 
& Orcutt, 2014), trauma (Lewis & Naugle, 2017), and post-traumatic stress (Kashdan & 
Kane, 2011; Thompson & Waltz, 2010). Indeed, there have been a number of proposals for 
the potential of experiential avoidance to serve as a generalized transdiagnostic measure for 
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psychopathology (e.g., Lewis & Naugle, 2017; Monestès et al., 2017; Spinhoven et al., 2014; 
but see also Levin et al., 2014, for a similar claim for psychological inflexibility more 
generally). 
According to Gillanders et al. (2014), cognitive fusion is conceptualized as a uni-
dimensional construct on a continuum from cognitive fusion to cognitive defusion. A client’s 
level of cognitive fusion is characterized by the extent to which they believe that their 
negative thoughts are literally true. A particular difficulty is that, apart from the 
psychological distress that believing (i.e., being fused with) negative and emotionally 
upsetting thoughts may cause individuals, cognitive fusion often leads to acting in accordance 
with such problematic thoughts. More explicitly, cognitive fusion is the process in which the 
content of their thoughts come to exert excessive control over individuals, leads to difficulty 
in tracking experiences outside of the actual content of those specific thoughts, and feel 
restricted and compelled to act on what the thoughts say they should do as (McCracken, 
Barker, & Chilcott, 2014). To help counteract the process of cognitive fusion, the aim of 
cognitive defusion, therefore, is to discompose the troublesome functions of negative 
thoughts by establishing non-literal contexts for the client to observe their thinking as a 
dynamic ongoing process (Luoma & Villatte, 2012). This faciltates defusion, or cognitive 
distancing, rather than only encountering the world as organized through their thoughts. 
Cognitive fusion and defusion have been found to help account for, amongst other clinical 
problems, approach-avoidance coping with stress (Donald, Atkins, Parker, Christie, & Guo, 
2017), psychological coping with inflammatory bowel disease (Trindade et al., 2017), 
suicidal ideation (Roush, Brown, Mitchell, & Cukrowicz, 2017), depression (Bardeen & 
Fergus, 2016), and body image dissatisfaction and eating disorders (Ferreira, Palmeira, & 
Trindade, 2014). 
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Committed Action is generally conceived as flexible persistence in goal-directed 
behavior (Hayes et al., 2006; Scott, McCracken, & Norton, 2016). As a component of ACT, it 
has most notably been successfully applied in the treatment of chronic pain patients 
(McCracken & Morley, 2015). Generally speaking, however, it is a relatively understudied 
sub-component process of psychological inflexibility. Encouragingly, Trindade, Marta-
Simoes, Ferreira, and Pinto-Gouveia (2018) examined committed action in both a healthy 
population and a sample with breast cancer, suggesting promising utility for this sub-
component of psychological flexibility as a therapeutic target. In terms of the present study 
with the focus on the psychological inflexibility model, it could be more helpfully 
conceptualized as lack of committed action, or simply inaction. 
Contact with the present moment (or more simply, present-moment awareness) is 
similar to many conceptualizations of mindfulness in the clinical literature (e.g., Brown & 
Ryan, 2003; Kabat-Zinn, 2003). It focuses on the assertion that we spend too much of our 
time thinking about an imagined future we have not yet experienced or ruminating about a 
past we cannot change. The result of this excessive focus on the constructed future or the past 
means that we lose connection to our direct and current experience (Luoma & Villatte, 2012). 
ACT encourages contact with the present moment via a strong emphasis on an ongoing and 
flexible awareness of a person’s current and direct experiences (i.e., psychological and 
environmental events), without negative judgments, evaluations, or maladaptive comparisons 
(Luoma & Villatte, 2012). With respect to the current study, lack of contact with the present 
moment reflects a tendency to be stuck in a constructed future or conceptualized past that 
does not allow for the disruption of unhelpful ruminative cycles as there is no mental space or 
quietude to allow for more flexible and adaptive response to life’s prevailing difficulties or 
challenges. 
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Two further less well-studied sub-components of the psychological inflexibility 
model are self-as-content and lack of values. For the purposes of the present study, the lack of 
well-validated and empirically supported measures of self-as-content and values at the time 
of data collection means that we will not assess those two sub-components of psychological 
inflexibility. 
 While acknowledging the burgeoning evidence supporting the validity of some 
measures assessing individual components of the psychological inflexibility model, Scott, 
McCracken, and Morley (2016) asserted that there was a clear necessity to examine the inter-
relationships of component processes in a more focused manner. A few studies have 
examined the interaction of two or more components of psychological inflexibility (e.g., 
Bardeen & Fergus, 2016; Hapenny & Fergus, 2017; Roush et al., 2017; Tyndall, Waldeck, 
Riva, Wesselmann, & Pancani, 2018). Such studies represent an important step in furthering 
our understanding of how the psychological inflexibility model functions as a theoretical 
account of psychological distress and lower emotional well-being. In particular, ACT theory 
suggests that experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion could be conceptualized as a ‘pair’ 
that influence emotional regulation (Hayes et al., 2012; see also Francis, Dawson, & Golijani-
Moghaddam, 2016). Bardeen and Fergus (2016), for example, explored the interactive effect 
of experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion with regard to symptoms of anxiety, 
depression, and posttraumatic stress. Bardeen and Fergus highlighted a particular risk factor 
for prolonged psychological distress, and the potential for the development of 
psychopathology more generally, as the combination of high experiential avoidance and high 
cognitive fusion. 
 In the context of psychological distress from perceived ostracism, Tyndall et al. 
(2018) unpacked Waldeck, Tyndall, Riva, and Chmiel’s (2017) finding that psychological 
inflexibility moderates distress from perceived ostracism with an examination of the 
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interaction effect of cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance. Tyndall et al. reported that, 
rather than the expected interaction effect, a structural equation model analysis found that 
experiential avoidance alone moderated the psychological distress from perceived ostracism 
over a period of six months. Such findings indicate that we have much to learn about how the 
psychological inflexibility model functions as sub-component processes may interact in 
expected or unexpected ways. 
  Scott et al. (2016) conducted confirmatory factor analyses on a number of core 
processes of the ACT model of psychological inflexibility with respect to health and 
wellbeing related outcome measures in chronic pain patients. More specifically, they 
administered the original Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (Hayes et al., 2004), the 
Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ; Gillanders et al., 2014), and Committed Action 
Questionnaire (CAQ-8; McCracken, Chilcott, & Norton, 2015) along with a measure of 
‘decentering’ which is somewhat related to the ACT model components of cognitive defusion 
(see Bernstein et al., 2015) and present moment awareness. Scott et al. reported that as there 
was an observed saturation of items across these measures, in that there was a significant load 
on one general factor they referred to as ‘openness’, this suggests that these separate 
measures do not reliably measure the unique portions of variance relating to purportedly 
distinct component processes that the model predicts. Moreover, Scott et al. found that there 
appeared to be two distinct components of decentering and committed action within the 
overall model. In a somewhat similar vein, Hayes, Villatte, Levin, and Hildebrandt  (2011) 
proposed that within the overarching psychological flexibility model there were three pairs or 
dyads of the original six components comprising (i) acceptance and defusion (i.e., open), (ii) 
present-moment awareness and self-as-context (i.e., aware), and (iii) values and committed 
action (i.e., active). Thus, it is not particularly clear as to whether the psychological 
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flexibility/inflexibility model is comprised of six distinct processes, or fewer overlapping 
processes (e.g., either 2 or 3 processes). 
 To help address concerns regarding the underlying conceptual structure of the ACT 
model (e.g., Christodoulou, Michaelides, & Karekla, 2018; Scott et al., 2016; Vowles, 
Sowden, & Ashworth, 2014), the present study proposes that a latent class analysis (LCA; 
Hagenaars & McCutcheon, 2002) of core components of the psychological inflexibility 
model could potentially elucidate the inter-relationships among ACT processes more clearly. 
Such a powerful analytic technique would potentially provide a clearer view of the 
psychological inflexibility model than we have seen in the literature to date as it could help 
isolate and identify significantly different classes of psychological inflexibility. In other 
words, latent class analysis is a person-centered statistical technique that can help identify 
subgroups of individuals who share common characteristics (Djelantik, Smid, Kleber, & 
Boelen, 2017) according to how they respond on different component measures of the 
psychological inflexibility model. Furthermore, importantly, the LCA technique can indicate 
whether these profiles predict levels of self-reported psychological distress or emotional 
wellbeing.  
The present study focused on a latent class analysis of sub-component inter-
relationships within the broader construct psychological inflexibility by including measures 
of the following core ACT component processes: (i) experiential avoidance (Brief 
Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire), (ii) cognitive fusion (Cognitive Fusion 
Questionnaire), (iii) lack of present moment awareness (5-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire), 
and (iv) lack of commitment to action (Committed Action Questionnaire-8); along with (v) 
the omnibus measure of psychological inflexibility and experiential avoidance (AAQ-II) 
itself. More specifically, the LCA examined these particular sub-components of the 
psychological inflexibility model with respect to levels of positive and negative emotionality 
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and overall self-reported psychological distress (i.e., depression, anxiety, and stress). Thus, 
the first aim of the present study was to discover if it was possible to identify significantly 
different subgroups (i.e., latent classes) of psychologically flexible or inflexible individuals 
based on a number of core constructs of the ACT model. The second aim was to examine if 
the different classes of psychological flexibility could meaningfully discriminate levels of 
self-reported depression, stress, anxiety (i.e., psychological distress), and positivity and 
negative emotionality. To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first to explore 
classes or subgroups of psychological inflexibility. Lastly, while an examination of 
sociodemographic variables is not typically a concern in research on psychological flexibility, 
studies using the LCA technique often explore relationships among sociodemographic 
variables and the latent classes of interest (e.g., Djelantik et al., 2017; Lenferink, de Kejser, 
Smid, Djelantik, & Boelen, 2017). Thus, as there was no substantive previous literature to 
suggest particular effects of sociodemographic variables on psychological flexibility, no 
specific a priori predictions were made. Notwithstanding, the present study used the LCA 
technique to examine potential associations between psychological flexibility class 
membership and sociodemographic variables of gender, relationship status, and education 
level. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample (N = 557; 354 women, 203 men) were recruited using an online survey 
distributed through emails to university networks within the UK and websites designed for 
academic research data collection (e.g., http:///www.findparticipants.com). The participants 
ranged between 18 and 73 years of age (Mage = 27; SD = 11). The sample consisted mostly of 
American (49.2%) and British (15.4%) residents. The majority of participants were of white 
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racial identity (83%) and employed in a broad array of industries. More specifically, 
participants reported that they were employed mostly within the health and social care 
industry (21%), education (15%), computer industry (10%), office and administration support 
(8%), sales (7%), government (6%), and arts and entertainment media (4%). Before data 
collection began, the study gained approval by the University of Chichester Research Ethics 
Committee.  
Measures 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II) 
The AAQ-II (Bond et al., 2011) is a 7-item measure of psychological inflexibility. 
Participants responded to items using a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all true) to 7 
(completely true; α = .93). Sample items include: “My painful memories prevent me from 
having a fulfilling life” and “I’m afraid of my feelings”. Test scores on the AAQ-II have 
demonstrated good internal consistency and test-retest reliability in community samples 
(Bond et al., 2011).  
Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ) 
The CFQ (Gillanders et al., 2014) is a 7-item measure of cognitive fusion that 
assesses the tendency for people to struggle and become entangled with distressing thoughts. 
Participants responded to items using a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all true) to 7 
(completely true; α = .87). Sample items include: “I struggle with my thoughts” and “I tend to 
get very tangled up in my thoughts”. The CFQ has demonstrated good internal consistency 
and construct validity in community samples (Gillanders et al., 2014). 
Brief Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (BEAQ) 
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The BEAQ (Gámez et al., 2014) is a 15-item measure of experiential avoidance, and 
was developed with separate student, community and patient samples. Participants responded 
to items using a 6-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly disagree; α = 
.87 in the present study). The BEAQ has demonstrated good internal consistency and 
construct validity (Gámez et al., 2014). Sample items include: “The key to a good life is 
never feeling any pain” and “I would give up a lot not to feel bad”. 
Committed Action Questionnaire (CAQ-8) 
The CAQ-8 (McCracken et al., 2015) is an 8-item measure of committed action, a 
component process of psychological flexibility that entails flexible persistence in goal-
directed behaviour.  Participants responded to items using a 6-point Likert scale from 0 
(never true) to 6 (always true; α = .62). Sample items include: “I prefer to change how I 
approach a goal rather than quit” and “If I felt distressed or discouraged, I let my 
commitments slide”. Analyses of the CAQ-8 have demonstrated good internal consistency 
and construct validity (McCracken et al., 2015). 
Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ-SF) 
The FFMQ-SF (Bohlmeijer, ten Klooster, Fledderus, Veehof, & Baer, 2011) was 
developed as a brief version (24 items) of the original 39 item FFMQ (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, 
Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006).  The FFMQ-SF assesses five facets of mindfulness including: 
observing, describing, acting with awareness, non-judging, and non-reactivity.  Items were 
scored on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (never or very rarely true) to 5 (very 
often or always true). Sample items include: “I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s 
happening in the present moment” and “Usually when I have distressing thoughts or images I 
can just notice them without reacting”. The FFMQ-SF has demonstrated good internal 
consistency and construct validity (Bohlmeijer et al., 2011). For the purposes of the present 
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study, we used the FFMQ-SF as a unidimensional measure to help ensure stable parameters 
for the analyses and increase interpretability of the solution. The internal consistency was low 
to moderate (α = .60). 
International-Positive and Negative Affect Schedule Short Form (I-PANAS-SF)) 
The I-PANAS-SF is a 10-item measure of affectivity, with 5 items assessing positive 
and 5 items assessing negative affectivity (Thompson, 2007). Items were scored on a 5-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always).  The I-PANAS-SF has demonstrated 
good internal consistency, temporal stability, construct validity, and cross-cultural factorial 
invariance (Thompson, 2007). Sample items include a response to the following question: 
“Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel to what extent do you generally feel?” 
in terms of a particular term such as “Ashamed” and “Nervous”. Internal consistency for 
positive (α = .80) and negative affectivity (α = .81) was good. 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales (DASS-21) 
To assess psychological distress, participants completed 21 items from the DASS-21 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The DASS-21 has been demonstrated to have sufficient 
construct validity in non-clinical samples (Henry & Crawford, 2005). Participants rated the 
frequency and severity of experiencing psychological distress in the last week. The items 
were rated on a 4-point Likert scale, where 0 represented “did not apply to me at all” and 3 
represented “applied to me very much or most of the time”, (α = .93). Sample items include: 
“I felt down-hearted and blue” and “I felt I was close to panic”. 
Procedure 
All seven self-report measures were uploaded to the internet with Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 
2014) online survey system. Participants were emailed a link to the webpage and responded 
to standard demographic questions and clicked on a forced-choice Informed Consent 
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confirmation question in order to proceed. A randomisation function on Qualtrics was chosen 
which selected the order of presentation of each of the seven measures at random. 
Participants completed all seven measures in one logged-in session. There were no missing 
data as a forced-choice function was activated to ensure each item was responded to before 
moving on to the next item. 
Data Management & Analysis 
Profiles were identified though a Latent Class Analysis (LCA; for an overview, see 
Hagenaars & McCutcheon, 2002). LCA is a technique that tests whether the scores on a set of 
variables can define homogeneous subgroups of individuals (i.e., classes) that are similar in 
the levels of these variables, thus identifying different profiles. Typically, several LCA 
solutions that differ in number of classes extracted are evaluated.  The LCA was ran on the 
composite scores of the AAQ-II, CFQ, BEAQ, CAQ-8, and 5FMQ, in order to identify 
groups of individuals based on the constructs measured by these instruments.  
The best solution (i.e., the best number of classes) was determined from both a 
statistical and a theoretical standpoint. The following statistical indices were considered: (1) 
the Bayesian information criteria (BIC), which is a measure of model fit; (2) entropy, which 
is a measure of certainty of the classification; (3) posterior probability of the classes, which 
indicates the precision of individual classification. A lower value of the BIC and values of 
entropy and posterior probabilities close to 1.00 indicate good fit of the solution. In addition, 
(4) the Lo-Mendell-Rubin adjusted likelihood ratio test (LMR) and, (5) the bootstrapped 
likelihood ratio test (BLRT) were used to directly compare two solutions, one with k classes 
and the other one with k–1 classes. A non-significant probability value associated to the 2-
times log-likelihood difference tested by the LMR and BLRT indicates that the narrower 
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solution (i.e., k – 1 classes) does not fit the data significantly worse than the wider one (i.e., k 
classes), hence it should be preferred.  
Statistical indices provide the basis for model selection, but the evaluation of the 
optimal LCA solution highly depends on theoretical considerations concerning the 
interpretability and meaningfulness of the profiles, as well as parsimony of the solution and 
absence of classes with too few members. Once the best LCA solution was determined, 
psychological and sociodemographic variables were compared among the identified profiles. 
Specifically, between-subjects ANOVAs were used to detect differences in the levels of 
depression, anxiety, stress, positive emotions, negative emotions, and age, whereas 
contingency tables and chi-square test were used to investigate gender (males vs. females), 
education level (high school or lower vs. higher than high school), and relationship status 
(singles vs. in a relationship). The LCA was performed using the statistical software Mplus, 
version 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012), whereas the ANOVAs, contingency tables, and chi-
square tests were performed using SPSS, version 24 (IBM Corp., 2016). 
Results 
Before conducting LCA, the composite scores of AAQ-II, CFQ, BEAQ, CAQ, and 
5FMQ were scaled to facilitate the interpretation of the profiles. Specifically, we converted 
the scores to a 0–100 range, where 0 indicated the lowest and most maladaptive level of a 
construct and 100 the highest and most adaptive one. Note that this strategy was employed 
simply to make the output (i.e., comparing levels of the constructs among classes) more 
readable in that it allows for greater clarity in viewing which constructs are higher or lower 
than others. If we had ran the same analysis on the original scales the relationships between 
the constructs would remain the same, yielding solutions with the same entropy and classes 
composed of the same participants. 
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Identification of Profiles 
Table 1 reports the fit indices of the six LCA models that were run extracting 2, 3, 4, 
5, and 6 classes, namely models K2, K3, K4, K5, and K6, respectively. The result of the 
BLRT test was not taken into account in the evaluation of the optimal number of classes 
because it always supported the wider solution between two competing models, thus it was 
considered uninformative. No more than six classes were estimated because the non-
significant probability associated to the LMR that compared K6 and K5 models indicated that 
five classes (i.e., model K5) were sufficient to explain our data and one more class was not 
really needed. Moreover, the BIC yielded by K6 was higher than that of K5, confirming that 
five classes were better than six classes and lead to the exclusion of K6 as a possible 
candidate for the optimal solution. Among the remaining four models, K5 yielded the lowest 
BIC and the LMR indicated that it performed significantly better than K4. However, two 
main reasons led to the exclusion of K5 as the optimal solution. First, it showed the lowest 
entropy and posterior probabilities, revealing a lower certainty and precision of the 
classification compared to that of the other solutions. Second, the class with the lowest 
posterior probability accounted for only 6.3% of the sample, suggesting that this model was 
not parsimonious. After the exclusion of K5, the lowest BIC was associated to K4, but, again, 
its entropy, posterior probabilities, and the LMR test indicated that model K3 performed 
better than K4. Finally, the comparison between K3 and K2 did not provide clear indications 
about which of these two models should be preferred from a statistical perspective. Indeed, 
the LMR test and the BIC supported the three-class solution, whereas entropy and posterior 
probabilities favored the two-class solution.  
Thus, a qualitative evaluation of the profiles that emerged from K3 and K2 was 
necessary. C1K2 and C2K2 were qualitatively similar to C1K3 and C3K3, respectively, but they 
differed in quantitative terms. Indeed, C1K2 and C1K3 drew highly comparable trajectories, 
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even though C1K2 variable means were higher than those of C1K3. Similarly, C2K2 and C3K3 
were qualitatively comparable, but C2K2 variable means were lower than those of C3K3. By 
contrast, the trajectory of C2K3 was in-between those of C1K3 and C3K3 and it was 
qualitatively different from the trajectories that emerged in the two-class model. A 
contingency table between the two solutions (i.e., K2 and K3) provided an explanation about 
what happened moving from the three- to the two-class solution. Indeed, no members of C3K3 
were also included in C1K2 and no members of C1K3 were also members of C2K2. This is the 
reason behind the similarities between the two pairs of classes mentioned above (i.e., C1K2
 – 
C1K3 and C2K2
 – C3K3).  
However, both the K2 classes included a high proportion of cases that were then 
classified in class C2K3 and that moved close and softened their trajectories compared to 
those of C1K3 and C3K3. In particular, C1K2 consisted of 53.5% of C1K3 members and 46.5% 
of C2K3 members, whereas C2K2 consisted of 66.8% of C3K3 members and 33.2% of C2K3 
members. In other words, the qualitatively new profile observed in K3 (i.e., C2K3) was split in 
about two halves that joined C1K3 and C3K3 and formed C1K2 and C2K2 in the two-class 
solution. Given the uniqueness of C2K3’s trajectory and the higher discrimination between 
C1K3 and C3K3 compared to that between their counterparts C1K2 and C2K2, the three-class 
solution (i.e., K3 model) was considered the best model to explain our data (see Figure 1). 
Differences among the Profiles of Psychological Flexibility 
Psychological Variables. The between-subjects ANOVA yielded significant results 
for all the psychological variables, indicating that the profiles differed for the levels of 
depression, F(2, 554) = 214.7, p < .001, η² = .44, anxiety, F(2, 554) = 118.9, p < .001, η² = 
.30, stress, F(2, 554) = 163.0, p < .001, η² = .37, positive emotions, F(2, 554) = 67.3, p < 
.001, η² = .20, and negative emotions, F(2, 554) = 262.4, p < .001, η² = .49. Figure 2 shows 
means and standard errors of the variables for each profile. A series of Bonferroni post-hoc 
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tests was performed to detect differences among profiles. The results revealed that all the 
pairwise comparisons were significantly different, p < .001. Specifically, Class 1 (denoted as 
Low Psychological Flexibility; 27.5%) showed the highest level of depression, M = 18.58, 
SD = 5.10, anxiety, M = 15.03, SD = 4.52, stress, M = 18.61, SD = 4.41, negative emotions, 
M = 20.58, SD = 4.29, and the lowest level of positive emotions, M = 17.84, SD = 4.54; Class 
3 (denoted as High Psychological Flexibility; 32.5%) showed the lowest level of depression, 
M = 9.26, SD = 2.76, anxiety, M = 8.93, SD = 2.21, stress, M = 10.81, SD = 3.08, and 
negative emotions, M = 11.24, SD = 2.68, and the highest level of positive emotions, M = 
23.62, SD = 4.27; finally, Class 2 (Moderate Psychological Flexibility; 40%) showed 
intermediate levels of depression, M = 13.04, SD = 4.25, anxiety, M = 11.43, SD = 3.81, 
stress, M = 14.14, SD = 4.21, negative emotions, M = 14.87, SD = 4.03, and positive 
emotions, M = 20.63, SD = 4.77. 
Sociodemographic Variables. The between-subjects ANOVA on age was 
significant, F(2, 554) = 19.52, p < .001, η² = .07. A Bonferroni post-hoc test revealed that 
Class 3 (High Psychological Flexibility), M = 31.88, SD = 13.88, significantly differed from 
Class 1 (Low Psychological Flexibility), M = 25.39, SD = 7.91, and Class 2 (Moderate 
Psychological Flexibility), M = 26.20, SD = 9.37, p < .001, but no difference was detected 
between the two latter profiles. Concerning the other sociodemographic variables, the 
Appendix reports contingency tables between these variables and the profiles. Gender, χ²(2) = 
6.39, p = .041, and relationship status, χ²(2) = 8.53, p = .014, were significantly associated 
with the profiles, whereas education level was not χ²(2) = 1.14, p = .56. Adjusted 
standardized residuals (ASRs) were then computed for each cell of the tables and examined 
to detect deviations from a random distribution of cases. Indeed, an ASR higher than 2.0 (or 
lower than -2.0) indicates that cases in that cell are overrepresented (or underrepresented) 
compared to what would be expected by chance. Concerning gender, males were 
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underrepresented (and females overrepresented) in Class 1 (Low Psychological Flexibility). 
Concerning relationship, singles were overrepresented in Class 1 (Low Psychological 
Flexibility) and underrepresented in Class 3 (High Psychological Flexibility), whereas the 
opposite was observed for participants in a relationship. 
 
Discussion 
In the present study, we aimed to identify distinct subgroups among psychologically 
flexible or inflexible individuals based on profiles of key constructs of the ACT model. 
Moreover, a further aim was to explore whether such potential classes could discriminate 
self-reported symptoms of psychological distress (i.e., depression, anxiety, and stress) and 
levels of positive and negative emotionality. Three subgroups were identified: (a) a High 
Psychological Flexibility subgroup characterized by low levels of experiential avoidance and 
cognitive fusion, and high levels of present-moment awareness and committed action. 
Moreover, the High Psychological Flexibility subgroup reported low levels of depression, 
anxiety, stress, and negative emotions while endorsing a high level of positive emotions; (b) a 
Moderate Psychological Flexibility subgroup characterized medium to moderate levels of 
experiential avoidance, cognitive fusion, present-moment awareness, committed action. 
Conjointly, the Moderate Psychological Flexibility subgroup reported moderate levels of 
depression, stress, anxiety, and positive and negative emotions; (c) a Low Psychological 
Flexibility subgroup characterized by high levels of experiential avoidance and cognitive 
fusion and low levels of mindful awareness and committed action. Furthermore, the Low 
Psychological Flexibility subgroup endorsed high levels of depression, stress, and anxiety, 
along with high levels of negative emotions and low levels of positive emotions. Thus, our 
results highlight that subgroups of psychologically flexible or inflexible individuals can be 
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clearly distinguished based on core components of the ACT model. Furthermore, each of the 
three classes of psychological flexibility identified here reported significantly different levels 
of psychological distress and positive and negative emotionality.  
The present study provides support for the utility of the broad spectrum of the ACT 
model of psychological flexibility, rather than overreliance on single measures of 
psychological flexibility or inflexibility. Moreover, the current data are noteworthy clinically 
in that the High Psychological Flexibility class all reported DASS-21 (i.e., depression, 
anxiety, and stress) scores lower than 12 while the Low Psychological Flexibility class 
reported distress scores of 15 or over on all three DASS components. The fact that the that 
LCA identified a Low Psychological Flexibility group in a non-clinical sample to report 
scores in what is considered within a moderately distressed range highlights the potential 
clinical utility of the overarching construct of psychological flexibility/inflexibility (see also 
Gloster et al., 2017; Levin et al., 2014). It is worth noting at this point, that as is typically the 
case with LCA, that the labels assigned (i.e., High, Moderate, and Low Psychological 
Flexibility) are descriptive and cautious in their designation and scope. It is possible, of 
course, to generate and assign other more eye-catching labels. However, we feel that these 
terms best describe the three distinct classes without extrapolating beyond the data that 
emerged in our analyses based on what is generally reported in the empirical literature using 
these scales employed. 
It was interesting to observe (see Figure 1) across the three separate profiles of 
psychological flexibility that three particular sub-component processes - experiential 
avoidance, committed action, and mindfulness/contact with the present moment - were 
remarkably stable in that if you knew a person’s score on experiential avoidance you could 
quite readily predict their score on committed action and contact with the present moment 
with reasonable accuracy. Likewise, if you knew a person’s level of committed action, you 
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could quite feasibly predict their probable level of experiential avoidance and contact with 
the present moment. This might suggest that experiential avoidance, committed action, and 
present-moment awareness together form a particular cluster within psychological flexibility 
that likely share an underlying latent factor. Furthermore, psychological inflexibility as 
assessed by the AAQ-II and cognitive fusion appeared to form a separate cluster within the 
overall model. This is somewhat unsurprising as the items of both the AAQ-II and CFQ have 
been found to load onto the same factor in certain samples (Gillanders et al. 2014; Scott et al., 
2016). 
There are various competing iterations of the underlying conceptual model of 
psychological flexibility/inflexibility in the literature (Christodoulou et al., 2018). In general 
terms, they are purported as (i) the six interrelating components structure outlined above with 
the overarching construct of psychological inflexibility (Hayes et al., 2006), (ii) a three-factor 
structure (i.e., Hayes et al.’s., 2011, conceptualization of three pairs or dyads of the original 
six components comprising acceptance and defusion, present-moment awareness and self-as-
context, and values and committed action; see also Frances et al., 2016; Vowles et al., 2014), 
and (iii) a two-factor solution consisting of mindfulness and acceptance, and commitment and 
behavior change (e.g., as noted earlier Scott et al., 2016, proposed a general underlying 
openness factor along with two distinct components of decentering and committed action; see 
also Villatte et al.’s, 2016, ACT OPEN and ACT ENGAGED modules). As the present study 
did not include measures of all six components of the psychological inflexibility model it is 
not possible to fully endorse any of the three competing conceptual models. However, as 
noted above, what we can gauge from this latent class analysis approach is that present-
moment awareness (i.e., mindfulness) and acceptance (i.e., opposite of experiential avoidance 
as measured by the BEAQ) and committed action appear to form a quite stable latent cluster. 
This does not fit readily with Scott et al.’s distinction between decentering and committed 
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action as separate factors within the model. As acknowledged earlier, as we did not measure 
self-as-content/self-as-context or values it is difficult to elucidate which conceptual model 
appears to have superior explanatory power. Nonetheless, the present data (see Figure 1) 
seem to suggest that the component processes have a complex interrelationship that suggests 
there might be more support for a three- or two-factor structure. Moreover, it seems from the 
present study that considering experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion as a pair or dyad 
(e.g., Hayes et al., 2011) within the overall model might not be useful as they appear 
functionally distinct, at least according to the somewhat limited self-report measures of these 
constructs (i.e., BEAQ and CFQ).  
Furthermore, it was not possible within the design of the present study (i.e., single 
time-point cross-sectional method) to examine any cause and effect relationship between 
individual sub-components of the model and overarching construct of psychological 
inflexibility. As noted by Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010), amongst others, it is difficult to 
assess whether psychological inflexibility causes experiential avoidance, cognitive fusion, 
inaction, and so on, or whether these components cause a person to be psychologically 
inflexible in their behavior. This causal directionality problem remains a significant concern 
for theorists working with the psychological inflexibility model (Christodoulou et al., 2018). 
One approach that future researchers could consider employing is latent growth curve 
analysis with data collection at multiple time points. 
There could be a case for arguing that the ACT model of psychological 
flexibility/inflexibility does not espouse such psychometric measures of sub-component 
processes of the model as ‘trait-like’ constructs. Thus, it could be debated that a latent class 
analysis might not actually fit with how ACT processes are conceptualized or 
operationalized. For example, in some ACT writings the six component processes are 
referred to as skills that can be altered or modified, rather than traits that are somewhat fixed 
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(see Christodoulou et al., 2018). However, it is apparent in some recent psychometric 
measure developments that, for example, the measure of cognitive fusion employed here (the 
CFQ) was designed as a trait measure because Bolderston et al. (2018) have developed and 
validated a separate State Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (SCFQ). Therefore, it is clear that 
at least in the manner that the measures employed in the present study were designed as 
instruments to assess trait-like constructs and indeed are typically utilized by researchers in 
the empirical literature as such, that there is ample justification for examining the 
psychological flexibility model with latent class approaches. 
There exists some degree of uncertainty and confusion over the construct and 
discriminant validity of some key ACT process measures (e.g., Rochefort, Baldwin, & 
Chmielewski, 2018; Scott et al., 2016; Vaughan-Johnson, Quickert, & MacDonald, 2017; 
Wolgast, 2014), and debate over how to assess the broad overarching construct of 
psychological inflexibility more generally (e.g., Fergus et al., 2012; Francis et al., 2016; 
Renshaw, 2018). The present study provides further support for the position that the AAQ-II 
and the BEAQ assess experiential avoidance in different ways or might not measure the same 
construct (e.g., Gàmez et al., 2014; Rochefort et al., 2018, Tyndall, Waldeck, Pancani, et al., 
2018). The BEAQ scores were quite stable with respect to committed action and contact with 
the present moment across all three subgroups of psychological flexibility whereas the AAQ-
II scores were the most volatile or unstable. For example, at low levels of psychological 
flexibility the AAQ-II scores were lower than BEAQ scores, while at high levels of 
psychological flexibility the AAQ-II scores were higher than BEAQ scores. Scores on both 
measures were quite similar at moderate levels of psychological flexibility though. It could be 
argued that the AAQ-II scores being so different from BEAQ scores at low and high levels of 
psychological flexibility indicates that it is a more useful measure of experiential avoidance 
as it might more reliably represent the level of a person’s psychological distress or wellbeing 
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than the BEAQ. However, it could also be argued that the AAQ-II scores at low and high 
levels of psychological flexibility support Wolgast’s (2014) proposition that the AAQ-II is 
actually a measure of psychological distress (see also Rochefort et al., 2018’s claim that it 
reflects the personality trait of neuroticism) rather than experiential avoidance. A cautious 
interpretation from the present study is that, as the BEAQ scores fit more readily with levels 
of committed action and contact with the present moment, the BEAQ is the more effective or 
favorable measure of experiential avoidance taking the overall ACT model into account. It 
should be acknowledged that it might take some time for this message to permeate the field 
as the use of the AAQ-II to assess experiential avoidance remains deeply ingrained in the 
clinical and non-clinical literatures (e.g., Blakey et al., 2017; Karademas et al., 2017; Karekla 
& Panayioutou, 2011; Monestès et al., 2017). 
While no specific a priori predictions were made regarding sociodemographic 
variables and psychological flexibility as there was little extant empirical literature to suggest 
expected differences, it was intriguing to note the higher levels of psychological flexibility 
among those in relationships than single persons. This interesting finding needs to be further 
explored in future research. Females were more likely than males to be characterized by low 
levels of psychological flexibility. Indeed, previous research has demonstrated that females 
tend to experience higher levels of psychological distress and utilize avoidant coping 
strategies compared to males (Matud, 2004). Furthermore, the education level achieved by an 
individual had no relationship to their profile of psychological flexibility. Future researchers 
could explore these observed gender and relationship differences in greater depth and in 
different contexts (e.g., specific psychological disorders) to see whether they represent a 
stable finding or one unique to the present study sample. 
 A limitation of the present study is that it relied exclusively on self-report 
questionnaire measures at one time point. Thus, it is possible that shared variance effects 
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could have inflated associations between variables. A second potential limitation could be 
that we employed a measure of mindfulness best represented by a five-factor solution as a 
single measure. We acknowledge that this is not ideal and future researchers could be 
encouraged to employ a different measure such as the Mindfulness Attention Awareness 
Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) instead. A further limitation of the current study is that 
it did not assess self-as-content or values due to a lack of sufficient empirical support (but see 
Moran, Almada, & McHugh, 2018) for measures of these sub-component processes for our 
purposes. However, it should be acknowledged that a number of instruments have been 
developed and researchers could consider including measures such as the Valuing 
Questionnaire (Smout, Davies, Burns, & Christie, 2014) and the Self Experiences 
Questionnaire (Yu, McCracken, & Norton, 2016) in future LCA analyses of the 
psychological inflexibility model. Similarly, future research could consider alternative 
measures of the overarching construct of psychological flexibility such as the Comprehensive 
Assessment of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (CompACT; Frances et al., 2016), the 
Avoidance and Fusion Questionnaire (Greco, Baer, & Lambert., 2008), or the 
Multidimensional Psychological Flexibility Inventory (MPFI; Rolffs, Rogge, & Wilson, 
2018), rather than the AAQ-II administered here. Researchers should be mindful, however, of 
the fact that it is not well known, as of yet, whether adding more indicators to a latent class 
analysis is a positive or negative analytic strategy (Wurpts & Geiser, 2014).  
 Future research could consider applying a latent class analysis to samples in a variety 
of clinical domains such as social anxiety disorder, clinical depression, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, eating disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Indeed, a latent class analysis 
with particular clinical sub-populations could potentially aid in the development of tailored 
therapeutic interventions for specific groups. For example, it might emerge that different 
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psychological disorders or conditions are typically characterized by rather distinctive clusters 
or profiles. 
 In conclusion, the current study represents an important addition to the literature as 
the first study to identify distinct subgroups of psychological flexibility based on core 
constructs of the ACT model using a latent class analysis. From a clinical perspective, this 
discovery was important as each of the three subgroups or classes of psychological flexibility 
reported significantly different levels of psychological distress and emotionality. This could 
aid clinicians and researchers to more accurately represent a client’s level of psychological 
flexibility across the broader spectrum of the ACT model, rather than the heretofore more 
typically reported reliance on one measure of psychological flexibility alone. Furthermore, 
such analyses as these could help provide clinicians with a more nuanced picture of 
mediation effects in ACT-based intervention studies to give a clearer picture as to which 
specific sub-components of psychological flexibility drive the improvements often observed. 
We hope that the current study serves to stimulate much needed research on sub-component 
processes within the ACT model of psychological flexibility. 
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Table 1  
The results of the Latent Class Analysis: statistical indices of the solutions were reported.  
 nfp BIC 2ΔLL LMR p BLRT p Entropy n (%) PP 
K2 (2 classes) 16 21809.5 1194.5 < .001 < .001 .89   
C1K2       286 (51.3) .97 
C2K2       271 (48.7) .96 
K3 (3 classes) 22 21509.2 338.2 .002 < .001 .85   
C1K3       153 (27.5) .93 
C2K3       223 (40.0) .91 
C3K3       181 (32.5) .95 
K4 (4 classes) 28 21392.9 154.2 .066 < .001 .83   
C1K4       108 (19.4) .92 
C2K4       193 (34.7) .90 
C3K4       173 (31.0) .88 
C4K4       83 (14.9) .89 
K5 (5 classes) 34 21356.3 74.4 .033 < .001 .83   
C1K5       35 (6.3) .86 
C2K5       124 (22.3) .89 
C3K5       164 (29.4) .89 
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C4K5       161 (28.9) .88 
C5K5       73 (13.1) .89 
K6 (6 classes) 40 21360.5 33.7 .073 < .001 .80   
C1K6       34 (6.1) .86 
C2K6       119 (21.4) .89 
C3K6       147 (26.4) .87 
C4K6       124 (22.3) .82 
C5K6       100 (17.9) .84 
C6K6       33 (5.9) .83 
Note. nfp = number of free parameters; BIC = bayesian information criterion; 2ΔLL = 2 times 
log-likelihood difference; LMR p = p-value associated to the Lo-Mendell-Rubin adjusted 
likelihood ratio test; BLRT p = p-value associated to the bootstrapped likelihood ratio test; n 
(%) = number and percentage of class members; PP = posterior probability of a class. 
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Table 2 
The means and standard deviations across the five measures in the three-class model solution.  
 
 AAQ-II CFQ BEAQ CAS 5FMQ 
C1-Low PF 37.27 (1.61) 33.22 (1.49) 50.36 (1.34) 55.21 (0.91) 53.20 (0.85) 
C2-Mod PF 63.48 (2.43) 54.06 (2.17) 61.01 (1.03) 61.85 (0.74) 62.77 (0.97) 
C3-High PF 85.60 (1.25) 78.79 (1.60) 74.61 (1.43) 71.14 (0.92) 74.18 (0.95) 
 
Note: C1-Low PF refers to Class 1 Low Psychological Flexibility; C2-Mod PF refers to Class 
2 Moderate Psychological Flexibility; C3-High PF refers to Class 3 High Psychological 
Flexibility. AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II; CFQ = Cognitive Fusion 
Questionnaire; BEAQ = Brief Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire; CAS = Committed 
Action Questionnaire; 5FMQ = 5-Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire. 
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Figure Captions 
 
 
Figure 1  – The results of the three-class model “K3”. 
Note. AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II; CFQ = Cognitive Fusion 
Questionnaire; BEAQ = Brief Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire; CAS = Committed 
Action Questionnaire; 5FMQ = 5-Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire. High PF = High 
Psychological Flexibility; Mod PF = Moderate Psychological Flexibility; Low PF = Low 
Psychological Flexibility 
 
Figure 2  – The results of the ANOVAs conducted on the psychological variables of 
depression, stress, anxiety (i.e., DASS-21), and positive and negative emotions (I-PANAS); 
means and standard errors of the K3 classes are displayed. 
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Figure 1 
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Appendix 
 Contingency tables between sociodemographic variables (in rows) and profiles (in columns) 
frequencies, percentages within rows and columns, and adjusted standard residuals are 
reported. 
  C3K1 C3K2 C3K3 
Gender     
Males Frequency 41 85 69 
 % within row 21.0 43.6 35.4 
 % within column 27.2 39.0 38.3 
 Adj. Std. Res. -2.5 1.4 1.0 
Females Frequency 110 133 111 
 % within row 31.1 37.6 31.4 
 % within column 72.8 61.0 61.7 
 Adj. Std. Res. 2.5 -1.4 -1.0 
Education Level     
≤ High school Frequency 36 48 34 
 % within row 30.5 40.7 28.8 
 % within column 23.5 21.5 18.8 
 Adj. Std. Res. 0.8 0.2 -1.0 
> High school Frequency 117 175 147 
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 % within row 26.7 39.9 33.5 
 % within column 76.5 78.5 81.2 
 Adj. Std. Res. -0.8 -0.2 1.0 
Relationship     
Singles Frequency 75 100 63 
 % within row 31.5 42.0 26.5 
 % within column 50.7 45.7 35.2 
 Adj. Std. Res. 2.0 0.8 -2.8 
In a relationship Frequency 73 119 116 
 % within row 23.7 38.6 37.7 
 % within column 49.3 54.3 64.8 
 Adj. Std. Res. -2.0 -0.8 2.8 
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